Philosophy 1110 (Introduction to Philosophy) Dr. Yalçın

Various Compatibilist (Soft Determinist) definitions of free will and action:

(1a) X did A freely in C=def. X did A in C, and the proximate cause of A was an internal condition of X.

Objection 1: This definition is way too weak. If the definition were true, then almost every action of X would count as being free. This is so, because the proximate cause of every action is an internal condition of X. To see this, remember that even the reflex actions of a person are proximately caused by internal conditions of that person. The only actions that would not count as being free would be movements of the body which are literally caused by external forces (such as when I grab and raise somebody’s arm).

Note: If because of this objection , the compatibilist changes his definition to:

(1b) X did A freely in C=def. X did A in C, and all the distal causes of A are internal conditions of X.

then the definition becomes too strong, because every action has an external distal cause (environmental conditions that go way back).

(2) X did A freely in C=def. X did A in C, and X could have refrained from doing A in C* (where C ≠ C*, that is, if the conditions had been different)

Objection 1: This definition is also way too weak. If this definition were true, then actions that should not count as being free would count as being free. For example, let us say that I jerk my leg because someone taps me just below the knee-cap (a reflex action). Since I would not have jerked my leg under different conditions (say if no one had tapped me below the knee-cap) my reflex action counts as a free action.

Here, C= conditions including a tap just below the knee-cap.

C*= conditions not including a tap just below the knee-cap.

Objection 2 (The Identity Objection): Beyond that, the definition seems to introduce something totally irrelevant to the question of my freedom under the circumstances I presently find myself in. Why should what I could have done in different circumstances be at all relevant to my freedom in my present circumstances?

(3a) X did A freely in C=def. X did A in C, and X could have refrained from doing A if she wanted (desired, intended, etc.) not to do A.

Objection 1 (The History Objection): The definition ignores the fact that given the historical, antecedent conditions that go all the way back before a person is born, a person’s wants, wishes, desires, intentions etc. are also determined. But if this is so, how could the person have not wanted to do A? And if he could not have wanted not to do A, in what sense is his doing A now free? It looks like he had to want to do A, and hence he had to do A.

Objection 2 : This is closely related to the History Objection above. This objection focuses on the fact that if a person is forced to want to do A, then even if she does A because she wants to, A still does not count as a free action. For example, if a hypnotist suggests to you during a trance that you will want a glass of water when you wake up, and you do want and get a glass of water after you wake up, your action (getting the water) does not count as freely performed. Hence, the definition (since it would count this a free action) is once again too weak.

Note: If because of objection 2, the compatibilist changes his definition to:

(3b) X did A freely in C=def. X did A in C, and X could have refrained from doing A if she freely wanted (desired, intended, etc.) not to do A.

then the definition becomes circular.